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who has old or destroyed the chattel.9 Trespass on the case may lie
when a cotenant's negligence has caused the destruction of the chattel."0
In conclusion there remains the question as to the remedies available
to a cotenant of indivisible personalty where there is no agreement on
possession and profits, and where there is no sale, destruction, or conversion to meet the requirements of the cases previously discussed. His
most effective remedy is to take peaceable possession of the property
if possible. But his cotenant may prevent this, since one who has actual
possession may retain it to the exclusion of his contenants." If the
property were divisible, he could recover his share or the value thereof."
But Wisconsin provides no comparable statutory remedy in the, case of
indivisible personal property. Thus it appears that the only remedy is
the statutory action for partition, where the property can be divided,
or sold upon court order where the property is not susceptible of division and the proceeds divided according to the interests of the parties.1"
FRANK W.

HAMMETT

Conflicts of Laws-Foreign Statute of Limitations Applied in Wrongful Death Action - The death of Lewis was allegedly due to the negligence of Defense Plant Corporation, which by Congressional authority
had been succeeded by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the
defendant in this case. The fatal injury occurred in Nebraska, where
a wrongful death act with a two-year statute of limitations was in effect.
The suit for wrongful death was brought in the District of Columbia,
where a one-year limitation existed in wrongful death actions. Plaintiff,
administratrix of the estate of the deceased, brought suit twenty-two
months after the fatal accident. She brought the action under the
Nebraska statute, and the defendant invoked as a bar the District of
Columbia one-year limitation. Held: The District of Columbia wrongful death statute establishing the one-year limitation was not applicable.
The time prescribed for filing suit operated as a limitation upon the
liability created by Nebraska statute, and was a condition attached to
the right to sue. The limitation of the state where the injuries occurred
governed and the public policy of the District of Columbia was not in
conflict. Lewis v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation,177 F (2d) 654
(C.C.A. D.C. 1949).

Ibid, p. 139.
Ibid p. 144.
11 Ibid p. 95.
12 Wis. Stat. (1947) Sec. 331.06.
13 Wis. State. (1947) Ch. 277.
9
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RECENT DECISIONS

The question and problem presented is whether the limitation of the
lex loci or that of the lex furo should apply to an action based upon a
statute of another state where the statute of the forum is shorter than
the one of the lex loci.
Statutes of limitations are generally regarded as regulations founded
on local policy and the general rule is that the law of the forum governs
with respect to limitations of actions.' But where an action for wrongful death is brought in a state other than the state in which the injury
causing death occurred, it is well-settled that where a conflict arises
matters relating merely to the remedy and procedure are governed by
2
th lex furo, but matters of substantive law are governed by the lex loci.
There is a conflict in the decisions as to which statute of limitations
applies in wrongful death actions. Some courts hold that the statute of
the forum is a procedural time limit and a declaration of state policy
precluding action, even where the statute of the lex loci allows a longer
period. 3 The courts following this line of reasoning hold that statutes
of limitations are designed to put litigation at rest after lapse of certain
4
periods of time, and cannot be extended by legislation in other states.
They assert that the limitation statutes can have no force beyond the
jurisdiction, and hold that the law of the forum governs all actions
with respect to limitations. 5
The opposing and majority view is that where a cause of action did
not exist at common law, but has been created by the statute of a state,
it only exists in the manner and form and for the length of time prescribed by the statute.6 It follows that where, by statute, a state creates
the cause of action for wrongful death and prescribes the limitation,
such limitation will be applied in a sister state, even though there is a
shorter limitation on similar statutory causes of action in the state of
the forum. 7 The lex loci should not only determine the lifetime of the
I Discussed in 15 C.J.S. 953 (1939).
225 C.J.S. 1097 (1941).
3

Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N.C. 397, 151 S.E. 857 (1930).

4 Cauley v. S.E. Massengill Co., 35 F.Supp. 371 (E.D. Tenn. 1940).
5 Discussed in 15 C.J.S. 954 (1939) ; Cases collected and discussed in 146 A.L.R.
1356 (1943) ; See Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 397, 603, 605; See also:
Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 67
S.Ct. 1355 (1946).
6 Wilson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 58 F.Supp. 844 (E.D. Ark. 1945) ; Summar
v. Besser Mfg. Co., 310 Mich. 347, 17 N.W. (2d) 209 (Death occurred in the
District of Columbia and the action was brought in Michigan. The Michigan
court applied the lex loci); Coffman v. Wood, 5 F.Supp. 906 (N.D. Ill. 1934)
(Death in Indiana and action brought in Illinois. Illinois court applied the Indiana statute) ; See also: Calvin v. West Coast Power Co., 44 F. Supp. 783 (Ore.
1942).
7 Wilson v. Massengill, 124 F. (2d) 666 (C.C.A. 6th 1942). Certiorari denied in

316 U.S. 686, 62 S.Ct. 1274 (1942).
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cause of action, but also should determine the time within which suit
may be brought in another jurisdiction."
Is the limitation in a wrongful death action a matter of substantive
right or merely a procedural matter?
The effect of the statute of limitations in a wrongful death act is to
prevent recovery upon the cause of action after a lapse of a period of
time after the wrongful death. This limitation does not affect the presentation of the facts, but seems to limit the substantive right of the
plaintiff. The right is not gone until lost under the statute that created
it. It would seem that the limitation terminates the substantive right
and so the lex loci should govern. The limitation seems to be part of
the substantive right and the courts should recognize it as such and not
as a mere matter of procedure.
EUGENE F. KOBEY

Majority Rule and Minority Rights, by Henry Steele Commager.
Peter Smith, New York, 1950 Pp. 92. $2.50.
Mr. Commager reconsiders the old problem of democracy, the preservation of majority rule and minority rights versus limited government. An analysis of the Hamiltonian solution (judicial review) discloses that after 150 years the United States Supreme Court has failed
to further and secure the human rights it purports to protect and:
"the congress and not the courts, emerges as the instrument for
the realization of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights."
Commager tenders the nation old "Jeffersonian solution" to this
problem and holds that the people themselves are best qualified to decide the ultimate merits of the constitutional rights involved. This answer is both workable and necessary for it offers a stimulant to the citizens of a democratic state which in turn it their preservation of their
form of government and their rights. The people never seriously
threatened any basic right because of reason, education, and natural
sanctions e.g. rebellions. The contention is made that the citizenry is
falsely lulled into apathy believing the courts are preserving their fundamental rights. This result tends to weaken a democracy.
This book represents the liberal position to the solution of majority
rule versus limited government and is recommended for its scholarly
and stimulating discussion of the problem.
EARL A. CHARLTON
8 Cases collected and discussed in 68 A.L.R. 217 (1930) ; 146 A.L.R. 1356 (1943).

